
























































Everybody knows what morality is – or, at the very least, everybody knows what morality is supposed to be.  People may disagree as to its basis, content or relevance, and even its logical coherence, but there’s pretty much unanimity as to what it purports:  namely, to be an other-regarding constraint on self-interest.  Even those who argue it doesn’t exist agree that that’s what doesn’t exist.  Of course, there is inevitable fuzziness around the edges.  Some would argue that morality is not actually separate from self-interest, but rather a particular manifestation of it; others may claim that other-regard is not really the point of morality though perhaps a natural byproduct; and (as we shall see) some might dispute whether morality need override self-interest.  Nonetheless, the idea of an other-regarding constraint on self-interest has been around throughout most of human history (see Wattles 1996).  Indeed, as species-wide the concept of morality bids fair to reflect the influence of evolution, as something whose possession contributes in some way to human fitness.  But, even putting aside the important issue of whether that provenance affects the legitimacy of the concept,​[1]​ other serious matters remain.  In particular, one may wonder about the nature of the other-regardingness that characterizes moral normativity, and about the details of the relationship between morality and self-interest.  Stephen Finlay, in “Too Much Morality”,​[2]​ lays out a provocative account of these latter concerns.  I will argue that it is majorly mistaken, but that the identification of where his account goes awry proves immensely useful in pointing the way to a more plausible approach.  

Finlay more or less agrees that morality is understood to be an other-regarding constraint on self-interest:

The realm of morality is commonly characterized in two distinctive ways:  first, by a particular kind of content.  Morality is commonly seen as purely other-regarding, as having its basic function in placing constraints on the pursuit of one’s own ends and interests for the sake of the interests of others.  Second, morality is distinguished by a particular kind of force … (pp. 139-140).

I say “more or less”:  a stickler is his claim that morality is “purely” other-regarding.  Finlay advocates a radically altruistic​[3]​ interpretation of morality’s normativity, a construal that he argues is – at one and the same time – both representative of the ordinary understanding of morality and diametrically at odds with common beliefs regarding its implications.  This paper will assess those claims.  In Section One I will lay out an account of Finlay’s radical altruism and its implications with respect to issues like self-abnegation, supererogation and overridingness, and in Section Two I will examine its pretension to represent the ordinary sense of morality.  Section Three addresses some logical and conceptual difficulties with Finlay’s view of morality.  An elaboration of a fairness-based alternative to his altruistic interpretation of morality’s normative content will be considered in Section Four.  Then Section Five will look into how morality exercises its constraint upon self-interest.  The possibility of supererogation will be investigated in Sections Six and Seven, and in Section Eight we’ll explore the related notion of a moral saint.  Section Nine will suggest an answer to the question “Why should I be moral?”.  Finally, Section Ten endeavors to sum things up.


Section One – Radical Altruism

Finlay’s fundamental claim with respect to the content of moral normativity is that it is “purely and essentially other-regarding, concerned only with the interests of others” (p. 140).  In other words, every legitimate want and need of every other should be considered, as such, to be a moral obligation for the self.​[4]​  He writes:

Morality is based on the ends of altruism, but it is not merely altruism. Altruism is subjective motivation towards some others’ good for their sakes, but any “others” will qualify ….  Morality, however, corresponds to a more universalistic concern:  it is dictated by something like a general benevolence, which desires for everyone their good.   In my view morality is defined in terms of such an end:  what we morally ought to do is approximately what we ought to do in order that others not lack their good.  (P. 143.)

We can represent his fundamental position syllogistically.   

(P1) To benefit the interests of others is morally good; 
(P2) One ought to do whatever is morally good; 
(C) Therefore, one ought to benefit the interests of others.

(P1) seems undeniable, at least in some qualified sense, given morality’s inherent other-regardingness.  The more crucial premise, as we shall see, is (P2), which posits a connection between “ought” and “good”.​[5]​  It may also seem obvious, but leads to the radical consequence of Finlay’s interpretation of morality, viz. conclusion (C), which amounts to an unconditional altruistic commitment to the concerns of others.  Claims akin to (P2) have been called the “good‑ought tie-up” and are seen as central to the “paradox of supererogation” (see Horgan and Timmons 2010, and Heyd 2015) – namely, how can moral actions go “beyond the call of duty” if one’s duty already includes everything that is morally good?  Supererogation and the proper analysis of (P2) will occupy much of the following (especially Sections Six and Seven).

It is indeed tempting to understand morality in terms of altruism, in terms of sacrificing one’s own interests on behalf of the interests of someone else.​[6]​  For that would appear the ultimate expression of regard for the concerns of others.  The core of moral normativity for Finlay – what it is for morality to be most important for a person – is to have “an all-things-considered preference under conditions of full information for the well-being of anonymous others over my own well-being.”  (P. 153.)  But from this radically altruistic conception of morality, Finlay draws three conclusions particularly at odds with ordinary beliefs:  (1) morality is self-abnegating, (2) morality is omnierogatory and (3) morality is not really overriding.  “Omnierogatory” is my amateur Latin for “everything is obligatory”;​[7]​ that is, on Finlay’s view (as we shall see) supererogation is not even possible:  there is nothing beyond what is morally required because there is nothing morally desirable, i.e. good or praiseworthy, that is not already therefore required of one.

That a normativity “concerned only with the interests of others” would exclude considerations of the self’s own interests is hardly surprising:  Finlay’s radical altruism is self-abnegating by definition.  Still, to underscore the plausibility of that exclusion, he explains why a moral duty to oneself, a la Kant, does not seem to make sense.  For an obligation to attend to our own interests, irrespective of those of others, would make it immoral to sacrifice on others’ behalf (at least all other things being equal).  But doing so – what we ordinarily consider supererogation, i.e. going beyond what duty requires – is seen instead as representing the zenith of moral concern.  Finlay writes:

To my ear it is absurd to condemn a person as immoral because he sacrificed too much for the sake of others – unless some others were somehow harmed by that sacrifice.  Some might think it irrational or foolish, for example, should one be trapped in a burning and overcrowded building, to refrain from fighting towards the exit in order that others might escape, but it is contrary to our ordinary grasp of the meaning of “moral” to suggest that such behavior is immoral or morally wrong.  (Pp. 140-141.)

In other words, from Finlay’s point of view it makes sense to exclude one’s own interests from the concerns of morality because morality by nature prioritizes the interests of others.

Morality is not properly conceived … as directing us to balance our interests against those of others, because of this basic asymmetry:  supposing there is a morally correct balance to strike, deviations to the benefit of the self are appropriately deemed immoral, while deviations to the benefit of others are not.  (P. 141.) 

In sum, radically altruistic normativity is “absurdly, perversely self-abnegating” (ibid.):  there is no moral provision for the self’s own interests as such, though Finlay allows it may be expedient to allot the self some minimal resources to sustain its ability to make sacrifices on the behalf of others.  (Finlay’s own position is not self-abnegating, however, because he denies morality’s rational authority to override self-interest; we will explore this more thoroughly below.)

As we have seen, on this conception of moral normativity it is not possible to go beyond what is morally required because there is nothing that is morally desirable that is not already thereby required.

It will be generally agreed, I think, that if giving hundreds of dollars is morally good, then selling one’s house and giving hundreds of thousands of dollars is morally better:  the notion of supererogation presupposes that the supererogatory act is morally superior to the obligatory act.  But as a rule, “best” seems to imply “ought”:  if the I-94 is the best route to drive to Chicago, then it’s the route you ought to take ….  Similarly therefore, if giving hundreds of thousands of dollars to tsunami victims is the morally best action I can perform, it is the action I morally ought to perform.  (P. 144.)

Calling Finlay’s radical altruism supererogatory would imply morality requires going beyond what is morally required, a bald contradiction​[8]​ – hence, my calling it omnierogatory.  As per critical premise (P2) in the syllogism mentioned earlier:  whatever is morally good (or better or best) is what one ought to do.

Consequently, radically altruistic normativity is unremittingly bleak and unappealing, with no provision for the self and with inexhaustible obligation to others.  As such, it may seem puzzling that morality would be revered throughout the ages as exemplifying how one ought to behave.  Finlay argues that ordinary folks are conflicted with respect to morality’s radical and extreme implications; we will address the plausibility of that response later.  For the time being, the question is this:  How could one suppose morality provides a plausible overall guide for conduct if it completely ignores the self’s own interests, projects, needs, wants, desires, aspirations and so forth?  Finlay’s answer is that it doesn’t provide an overall guide.  Here is why he questions a rational basis for moral overridingness:
it does not seem incoherent to ask yourself seriously, “Why should I be moral/do the morally right thing?”, to judge yourself to lack sufficient reason for being moral, or to find the pinnacle of moral virtue to be unworthy of your aspirations and encouragement.  This does not prove that morality lacks overriding normative authority, but it does mean that it would be a substantive rather than a conceptual truth that morality is overriding were it in fact the case.  (P. 142.)

He rejects the possibility of establishing morality’s authority on “conceptual” or purely rational grounds; rather, it’s a “substantive” or empirical matter whether a given person finds moral interests more important than non-moral concerns:  “Questions of importance and normative priority are subjective or personal questions” (p. 154).  William Frankena, a philosopher cited by Finlay, makes an even more general claim:

View I [regarding an action-guide (AG) “as definitive, final, over-riding, or supremely authoritative”] also makes nonsense of the question, “Why should I be moral?”  For one cannot oneself take an AG as supremely authoritative and still ask, sensibly, “Why should I live by it?”  (Frankena 1966, pp. 125, 128.)

While Finlay is arguing only that the morality’s authority cannot be made true simply on conceptual grounds, Frankena is suggesting that the intelligibility of asking “Why should I be moral?” rules out even a substantive basis for overridingness.  Either way, the patent plausibility of that question seems to expose the hollowness of morality’s pretense to override.


Section Two – Morality and Ordinary Opinion

Perhaps the least persuasive part of Finlay’s account is his claim that radical altruism represents the common understanding of morality:  “self-regarding considerations do not belong in what is ordinarily meant by ‘morality’.”  (P. 141.)  While it is clear that he desires the imprimatur of ordinary language for his view that moral normativity is purely other-regarding, i.e. concerned only with the interests of others, his effort to garner that authority is underwhelming.  

Often he is content simply to assert his position, without any recognition that that may be tendentious.  As we have seen, he begins his discussion of moral normativity with the bald claim that “Morality is commonly seen as purely other-regarding”.  But this rejection of any moral concern for the self – this other-regarding purity – is obviously mistaken if taken as a description of philosophical consensus.​[9]​  Indeed, Finlay explicitly disputes both utilitarians and Kantians on this precise point:  the former with respect to everyone (both other and self) counting as one, and the latter with regard to duties to oneself.  If the two dominant strains of contemporary ethical thought disagree with a normative view, then that view is not “common” among philosophers.​[10]​  Furthermore, by Finlay’s own admission that purity is equally incorrect regarding non-philosophical views:  “ordinary opinion … considers morality to be most of the time an indulgent mistress ….  [S]he permits us to put our own and our loved ones’ safety and basic needs first.”  (P. 143.)  Consequently, the blunt claim – that morality is commonly seen as purely other-regarding – is just false.

And when he does give an argument, as likely as not he is arguing, not that ordinary folks do accept his “stringent”, self-abnegating conception of morality, but rather that ordinary folks should accept it. With respect to the acceptance of “duties to the self”, for instance, Finlay points out that that would seem to conflict with the common view that self-sacrifice for the benefit of others represents the height of ethical commitment:  “it is contrary to our ordinary grasp of the meaning of ‘moral’ to suggest that such behavior is immoral or morally wrong.”  But granting this point hardly implies ordinary people share his stringent conception of morality – at best it shows only that the common understanding of moral normativity is philosophically complicated.  As Finlay points out, even “Many philosophers … offer theories sweetening the content of morality by including duties to the self” (p. 141).  If philosophers can be guilty of that error, if indeed it is one, then surely common folk can as well.  Consequently, arguments that purport to show that that duties to the self should be rejected – that morality should be believed to be purely other-regarding – do nothing to show that’s what ordinary people do in fact believe.  If ordinary beliefs were always correct there would be no need for philosophers.

Finlay’s conflation of what common folks do believe versus what they ought to believe regarding moral normativity comes to a head in the following passage:

    Still, we have a conflict of intuitions:  many people deny vehemently that we are subject to such stringent moral requirements.  Given the aim of capturing the ordinary conception of morality, and the subsequent need to defer to ordinary judgments, ought we not at least concede that we may have here two separate moral communities and two separate concepts of “morality”?  I suggest rather that there is here a single moral community, but that proponents of a nonstringent morality are in error, and those who share the moral judgments of the moral saints are correct.  (P. 145; my emphases.)

However, what he is describing is not a “single” moral community, but one starkly bifurcated into the “many” with an erroneous belief in nonstringency, and the few who share the purportedly correct views of “moral saints”.  Even though the latter presumably constitute but a negligible fraction of the total population, in Finlay’s view they, and not common folk, are the ones we should rely on for “the ordinary conception of morality”!  But that is absurd:  the ordinary view is the one that ordinary people do have – however “in error” – and not some view that somebody decides they should have.  Finlay (16Jan2017) explains:  “My argument is that there is good reason to take the intuitions of moral saints as more reliable than the intuitions of ‘ordinary’ folk.”  However, it is quite obvious that the linguistic intuitions of ordinary folk are a more reliable indication of the linguistic intuitions of ordinary folk than are those of moral saints.


Finlay nonetheless advances some considerations that can be seen as supporting his belief that “self-regarding considerations do not belong in what is ordinarily meant by ‘morality’.”  Let’s look at three such.  First, subsequent to his discussion of the apparent conflict between duties to the self and self-sacrifice for others, he declares:  “We can therefore conclude from the authority of ordinary usage that it is a conceptual truth that morality addresses to each of us only considerations arising from the interests of others” (pp. 142-143; my emphasis).  As we have seen, Finlay’s critique of self-duty does not warrant any such inference regarding ordinary usage.  However, that critique is followed by a passage that just precedes the purported conclusion, and which perhaps he sees as some basis for it.  Therein he makes the argument that other-regardingness, and not rational overridingness, is what is essential to “the ordinary concept of morality”:  

it does not seem incoherent to ask yourself seriously, “Why should I be moral/ do the morally right thing?” to judge yourself to lack sufficient reason for being moral, or to find the pinnacle of moral virtue to be unworthy of your aspirations and encouragement….  On the other hand, the idea that (e.g.) gratuitous cruelty could turn out to be morally right seems (absent some story about how it would actually be beneficial to others) quite incoherent.  (P. 142.)

However, neither of these claims about the ordinary concept of morality supports what he wishes to  “conclude”.  First, even were there no rational basis for morality’s presumptive overriding authority (something to be debated below), at best that would show only that Finlay’s view is humanly tolerable.  That is, even if there were no need to abide by morality’s requisites, that hardly establishes only other-regarding as the common view of morality.  As well, the inherent unacceptability of gratuitous cruelty only shows that morality is essentially other-regarding, not that it is purely other-regarding.  Consequently, neither of the above claims about the concept of morality, however revelatory about “the authority of ordinary usage”, warrant any conclusion about other-regarding exclusivity.

A second reason Finlay suggests for believing that ordinary folks accept his stringent, self-abnegating view of morality is the admiration we have for the self-sacrificing actions of moral saints.

It is an uncomfortable even if not an absurd thought that our orientation toward moral saints is to esteem them for their morally admirable acts while considering those same acts to stem from an erroneous judgment of their duty!  But I also doubt that moral saints are the only people who have these moral intuitions:  many of us feel shamed when we contemplate acts of moral heroism ….  A great many more people who are not moral saints themselves share the moral saints’ judgments about what they morally ought to do.  (Pp. 144-145.)

Finlay’s thought is that ordinary folks are conflicted in their understanding of morality, viewing it both as “an indulgent mistress” and as “perversely self-abnegating”.​[11]​  However, as we shall see, imputing Finlay’s stringent view to moral saints is not the only way to account for their self-sacrificing behavior.  And even were they to share his radically altruistic opinion, it hardly follows that our admiration and sympathy imply we share that view in any substantive fashion.  His own example betrays this:  “Among most people I feel no shame about eating meat, but when surrounded by conscientious vegetarians I find myself without excuse” (p. 147).  It is hardly implausible to suppose that, notwithstanding those temporary feelings of shame, Finlay is still eating meat; i.e., however great one’s esteem for someone’s views and accomplishments, that needn’t entail one’s adoption of their judgements in any significant way.

Indeed, there is something of a puzzle about Finlay’s self-professed admiration for moral saints, because on his approach such persons must fall into one of two decidedly unimpressive categories.  One, they may be the rare, curious sort of individual who can honestly proclaim, “I have an all-things-considered preference under conditions of full information for the wellbeing of anonymous others over my own wellbeing” (p. 153).  But, on Finlay’s account, this preference holds no special status among the other ends or desires a person might have; indeed, his paper concludes:  “it is fair to say that for virtually all of us, most of what we morally ought to do … is less important than the pursuit of certain of our selfish [i.e., non-benevolent] concerns.”  (P. 154.)  But then why credit moral saints for having “thought long and hard about the requirements of morality”, or “esteem them for their morally admirable acts”, if they’re just another bunch of oddballs with eccentric interests a la philatelists, flat-earthers, Revolutionary War reenactors or astrology-buffs.  Two, if moral saints don’t have any overwhelming preference for benefiting others, then they are, frankly, chumps who have failed to realize there’s no justification for morality’s supposition of overridingness:  pitiable dupes who have been fooled into thinking morality has rational authority over one’s more selfish interests.  In neither case do moral saints have any claim on our sympathy or esteem.​[12]​  Regardless, however high the admiration ordinary folks have for them, that simply doesn’t entail any substantive assimilation of their moral views.

A third basis Finlay may have for believing morality is ordinarily understood as purely other-regarding is revealed by his effort to resolve the apparent contradiction between that belief and the fact that “ordinary opinion … considers morality to be most of the time an indulgent mistress.”  Ordinary words and concepts are what are used in expressing ordinary opinions, so if those opinions accommodate a nonstringent view of morality, surely so also the words and concepts used in espousing them.  Nonetheless, Finlay argues to the contrary.

    The problem has to be addressed, however, of how it can be that the concept of “morality” is determined by ordinary usage, but that ordinary judgments are wrong most of the time.  The idea here is simple enough:  ordinary usage applies a criterion of what counts as morally required and permitted.  But it misapplies this criterion, such that it judges actions to be morally permitted that in fact are not.  Consider analogously … witches ….  The (traditional) concept witch is determined by the referential intentions of the linguistic community as applying to any woman with supernatural powers.  But they judge incorrectly that certain women meet this criterion, and hence systematically misapply their own word.  (P. 145.)

He seemingly has in mind something like this:  the concept moral is determined by the referential intentions of the linguistic community as applying only to judgements that are purely other-regarding; however, ordinary folks determine incorrectly that certain self-regarding judgements meet that criterion.  But this is perplexing in its own right:  how can ordinary folks not be aware of the referential intentions of the linguistic community?  They are that community – those are their intentions.  Then how can they hold that morality is concerned only with the interests of others and still sometimes suppose it is concerned also with the self’s interests?  Are we to imagine that common folk are so dim they don’t understand what “only” means?  

Putting that aside, Finlay has plainly misconstrued his proposed analogy.​[13]​  For the problem with witch is not that the concept is misapplied in “certain” cases, but rather that it is factually mistaken:  it never can be correctly applied.  So if the analogy holds, then the problem with the referential intentions of the linguistic community with respect to the ordinary concept of morality would be that it also presupposes something false (at least according to Finlay), viz. that it could ever be applied to self-regarding actions as such.  That is, the analogy would imply, not that the ordinary concept of morality is misapplied in certain cases, but rather that it’s a mistakenly nonstringent concept with no correct application.  In other words, the witch case suggests the exact opposite of what he supposes:  that it’s the ordinary concept of morality that’s mistaken (from Finlay’s vantage), not any particular misuse of it.  So instead of posing an implausible scenario in which stringent moral concepts somehow eventuate in nonstringent moral judgements, the analogy suggests rather that the moral concepts and judgements of common folk are in nonstringent accord – again, regardless of whether that nonstringency is “in error”.  

The idea that the common understanding of morality sees it, not just as other-regarding but as purely other-regarding, was dubious right from the start.  As we shall see in Section Four, there is a much older, less radical, better documented, and more widely accepted understanding of the amount of regard owed others.  Finlay cannot count on the imprimatur of ordinary usage to justify his radically altruistic interpretation of moral normativity; it must stand on its own.


Section Three – Problems With Radical Altruism

Let us put aside the question of whether Finlay’s views on radical altruism capture the ordinary understanding of morality, and instead assess their plausibility in their own right.  As we have witnessed, he has a tendency to intercalate concerns about what common people do believe with what common people – and philosophers as well – should believe.  So even if ordinary folks don’t have a radically altruistic view of moral normativity, perhaps he’s correct in arguing they ought to.  There are two important sides to Finlay’s argument:  one, the claim that morality is purely other-regarding; and two, the denial that morality is rationally overriding.  We’ll look at them in turn.

First, a brief note on methodology.  Assessing a normative system requires that we examine how it handles various telling circumstances.  Valuative judgements can only approach reasonable certitude under the assumption that the relevant conditions are known, i.e. they require a ceteris paribus or “all other things being equal” qualification.  This is the frank admission that further complications – inequalities in circumstance – can affect normative judgement no less than additional masses can affect the behavior of a body in a shared gravitational system.  So, in the following, it should be assumed that example normative judgements carry ceteris paribus clauses when not explicitly expressed.  Of course, in the evaluation of a normative view it also helps to focus on simpler test circumstances – “moral microworlds”, as it were.  Not only is it easier to reach judgement, but of course any normative system that fails under the most elementary conditions can hardly be trusted when things get more complicated.


One, pure other-regardingness.  The problem with the idea that morality is purely other‑regarding is that it is impossible in practice.  It overlooks the fact that human society represents a closed system:  benefits that you forgo in your role as self to another’s other you stand to reap in your role as other to that person’s self.  For example, if everyone started with equal amounts of stuff, even were everyone to altruistically contribute 100% of it to others, with equitable distribution everyone would still finish with the same amount of stuff.  In other words, if everybody treated everybody else’s interests as more important than their own, everybody’s interests would end up being treated equally regardless.  So why not do so directly instead of going through an altruistic charade?  Indeed, self versus other is only a matter of perspective:  in reality, all persons appear as both selves and others.  As a result, it is incoherent to make moral assessment contingent upon that distinction:  a contradictory appraisal is unavoidable if persons’ right and wrong qua “self” doesn’t match up with their right and wrong qua “other”.  Suppose Bill and Jill wish to reach agreement regarding a mutual exchange of goods and services.  If Bill is to be radically altruistic, he must make the deal as advantageous as possible for Jill, even to the point of significant self-sacrifice.  But for Jill to be radically altruistic, it has to be the exact opposite:  she must sacrifice and give Bill the more advantageous deal.  So Finlay’s view of moral normativity leads to contradictory results in even the most elementary circumstances.  This bears repeating:  radically altruistic normativity as such is logically incoherent.

It may be objected that I am interpreting his view too severely:  that a more moderate construal of Finlay’s radical altruism could avoid the charge of incoherence.  But when plausible qualifications are attempted in the effort to ameliorate the contradiction, the pointlessness of this kind of self-other discrimination is laid bare.  Imagine that Bill and Jill are off alone somewhere, and dependent upon on shared pies for their sustenance.  But how to divide the daily pie?  As we have seen, if both strive simultaneously to be radically altruistic, the situation is impossible.  If Bill is to be purely other-regarding he must give Jill the whole pie, perhaps minus a pittance so he can make it through the day.  But if Jill is to be properly self-abnegating, she must instead give the lion’s share of the pie to Bill.  Therefore, strictly according to radical altruism, Bill and Jill must both get the lion’s share and both get a mere pittance, a direct contradiction.  But suppose we relax the rules and allow Bill and Jill to take turns divvying up the diurnal pastie.  So all seems well:  when it’s Bill’s turn, he gives the great majority of the pie to Jill, and when it’s Jill’s turn to divide, she returns the favor, each still acting in accordance with the requirements of radical altruism.  But after doing this for awhile, they may get together and decide to simplify things.  After all, it’s just a bit uncomfortable and perhaps even unhealthy to stuff oneself one day and starve the next.  But if they just divide the pastie down the middle, they will each end up with the same amount of food in the long run without the inconvenience of the starve-stuff cycle.  So the most plausible way of relaxing the strict rules of radical altruism, in the effort to avoid the self-other contradiction, collapses it into egalitarianism – i.e., it makes sense for two people to divide the pie equally.​[14]​  By the same reasoning, if you add another person to the group, say Will, it will make sense to divide the pie into three equal pieces; and so on:  for n persons, divide the pie into n equal pieces.  

Consequently, we have arrived at a plausible answer to the question of what regard morality requires we accord the interests of others:  treat them as equal to your own.  You mayn’t treat them as less important and you needn’t treat them as more important, but as a minimum you must treat others’ interests as equal in importance to your own.  This is a much less stringent conception of moral normativity, one for which neither self-abnegation nor omnierogation are required, and therefore one for which the presumption of overriding authority no longer appears quite so intolerable.  (Indeed, it’s the only ratio of importance of self to other interests that is not inherently inconsistent.)  But we are getting ahead of ourselves.  The exploration of an egalitarian alternative to Finlay’s radical altruism must await an assessment of moral authority.


Two, no rational overridingness.  Given his bleaker vision of morality’s normativity, it is not unexpected that Finlay questions any presumption of authoritativeness:

On the view I am advancing, self-regarding considerations do not belong in what is ordinarily meant by “morality”.  Is this view then perversely self-abnegating?  It is so only if it accepts the rationalist interpretation of morality’s categorical force – which I do not. (Pp. 141-142.)

However, the only argument Finlay provides is the point encountered earlier:  that it makes sense to ask “Why should I be moral?”  Recall his claim that the intelligibility of asking that question reveals the lack of a “conceptual” basis – that moral overridingness, insofar as it exists, is merely a “substantive” fact about the relative importance of moral considerations for particular persons.  Frankena went even further by claiming that the sensibility of such questions is incompatible with any basis for supposing that morality is “supremely authoritative”.  

But surely both are mistaken.  For if it is coherent to ask if moral overridingness has rational authority, then it is coherent to imagine that the answer is “Yes”.  Transport yourself back to the time between 1637 and 1994 when the status of Pierre de Fermat’s famous Last Theorem was unknown .​[15]​  It was then coherent to wonder whether it should be taken to be true:  whether there were sufficient rational reason to so regard it.  But from the coherence of supposing it false one could not infer the incoherence of supposing it true.  That absence of proof hardly proved that none would or could be forthcoming, as Andrew Wiles made clear with his 1995 formal demonstration.  And during all those years when its theoremhood was unknown there was still reason to think Fermat’s Last Theorem was true:  computers had tested it for huge values of n, and of course it carried Fermat’s personal endorsement.  There was simply insufficient rational reason, by the strict standards of mathematics.  Similarly, in the present day there is no apparent consensus amongst philosophers as to what does or could provide a rational basis for morality’s presumption of authority.  Still, however much they otherwise disagree, many persons who have thought long and hard about the matter believe there is such a basis, and they may conceivably some day arrive at consensus regarding it.​[16]​  It is indeed coherent to ask “Why should I be moral?”, and it is also coherent to imagine that a rationally sufficient reason may be forthcoming.  So there is nothing inherently problematic about questioning the basis of something posed as authoritative, in the effort to discover whether there is rational warrant for that authority.  


In asking whether there is any rational foundation for morality’s presumptive authority over self-interest, we are asking whether morality provides us a reason for overriding other interests.  But few contemporary philosophical questions are more contentious than “What is a reason?” (see e.g. Finlay 2009).  So let us reframe things in an effort to sidestep that snare:  instead of asking whether there is a rational basis for morality’s presumption of overridingness, let’s simply assume that morality constitutes its own peculiar form of rationality.  Suppose, however, that this moral rationality stands on its own, and that its importance is independent of other forms of reasoning.  In particular, failure to commit to moral rationality need not be assumed to have consequences with respect to practical reasoning in general, contrary to what some have argued (e.g. Nagel 1978 and Korsgaard 1986) .  So rather than asking whether there is a rational basis for morality, we instead ask whether there is any need to be morally rational.  More particularly, two questions need be addressed.  First, what is the nature of the supposed moral constraint on a person’s interests – how is it imposed and to what effect?  And second, what possible motive could a person have for submitting to such a constraint?  We will explore their answers below (in Sections Five and Nine, respectively) when we look more generally at the issue of morality vs. self-interest.  But, before that, we need to develop a plausible alternative to Finlay’s radical altruism.


Section Four – Fair Egalitarianism

The radically altruistic interpretation of moral normativity has been found beset with difficulties.  While it’s clear that morality is essentially other-regarding, the notion that it is purely other-regarding comports neither with common sense nor with logic.  The good news is that, through failing, this conception of normativity has pointed the way to a more plausible replacement.  One reason Finlay may have been led to that supposition of purity is his embrace of (P2):  whatever is moral required is what I personally ought to do.  For, as he points out, the amount of misery and woe in the world in need of moral redress is effectively endless.  And while the amount of moral concern owed to others appears boundless, to assume that there is any owed to oneself would seem – as we have seen – to render supererogation immoral.  Thus one arrives at Finlay’s conclusion that commitment to morality requires “an all-things-considered preference under conditions of full information for the well-being of anonymous others over my own well-being.”  Or, to put the point more vividly, morality implies

	(RA)  I need to value the interests of others as infinitely superior to my own.

But as Finlay himself argues, there is no good reason for supposing that others actually deserve this lofty esteem.  Indeed, all other things being equal, there is no basis for preferring the interests of other or self.  So consider instead what I will call the fair egalitarian interpretation of moral normativity:

(FE)  I need to value the interests of others as equal to my own. 

It is “egalitarian” because the interests of all persons – both selves and others – are weighted equally, and “fair” because outcomes are required to be equitable.​[17]​  Fair egalitarian normativity provides obvious grounds for rejecting omnierogation – one is obliged to accord the interests of others a value equal to one’s own, but it hardly seems wrong to accord them even greater value.  But while exceeding in regard for others might sometimes be desirable, it simply isn’t required:  you aren’t obligated to sacrifice all your own interests in service to others.  So fair egalitarian morality is not self-abnegating either – your concerns are just as important as anybody else’s.  Consequently, no overwhelming burden is posed by the assumption that morality is authoritative over self-interest.

Thus, fair egalitarianism avoids the problematic implications (1)-(3) we have found bedeviling radical altruism:  it is neither omnierogatory, self-abnegating nor anti-overriding.  But how well does it fare before the tribunal of ordinary usage?  One way to assess what ordinary people throughout the ages have believed to be the normative content of morality is to look at the principles they have used express that content.  And there is one such principle that crops up in one version or another in practically every culture and religion throughout most of human history – I speak, of course, of the Golden Rule (see Wattles 1996).  The Christian version will be familiar:  “Do unto others as you would have others do unto you.”  A variant is even more perspicuous:  “Love thy neighbor as thyself.”  It is revealing that Finlay cites a version of this in support of radical altruism:  “The similarities with Jesus’ ethical teaching to love others as you love yourself (where I assume self-love is assumed rather than exhorted) are, I am sure, quite nonaccidental.”  (P. 143 note 27.)  But Jesus did not say “Love thy neighbor but not thyself” or even “Love thy neighbor more than thyself”.  Jesus was no Finlayian purist – he said “Love thy neighbor as thyself”.  And while its Biblical exegesis runs miles deep, a plain reading of that text is “Regard the interests of others with the same importance you regard your own”, or simply, “Regard the interests of others as equal to your own.”​[18]​  In other words, there is a prodigious historical tradition of interpreting moral normativity as a requirement, not for (RA)’s abject self-sacrifice, but rather for (FE)’s equitable treatment of both self and other.

As we have seen, at one point Finlay’s argument explicitly discounts (FE). 

Morality is not properly conceived … as directing us to balance our interests against those of others, because of this basic asymmetry:  supposing there is a morally correct balance to strike, deviations to the benefit of the self are appropriately deemed immoral, while deviations to the benefit of others are not.  Standard utilitarianism, which bids us count ourselves as morally worth no more but no less than anyone else, falls afoul of this point ….  (P. 141.)

This is pretty much the same issue he raises in his criticism of duties to the self, viz. in the self-reflexive case the notion of moral obligation is problematic – we can call it self-other normative asymmetry.​[19]​   For in the case of self-on-self moral infractions there is a kind of logical singularity.   Such transgressions are fundamentally distinct from self-on-other or other-on self cases in that there is no one else to blame:  no one is being a victim of somebody else’s interests.  If the point of moral constraint is to put a limit on how important someone regards their own interests in comparison to those of others, then the self-on-self case is logically unique – one cannot possibly suppose that one’s own interests are more (or less) important than one’s own interests.   But this is self-other asymmetry; it does not distinguish the normative status of one person from the next because all persons appear as both self and other.  Just as I may be excused for deviations to the benefit of others but not to my self, others may be excused for deviations to the benefit of my self but not to their own selves.  In virtue of this, it is not “improper” to suppose one’s interests are balanced with (or “against”) those of other persons, as (FE) has it.  In other words, pace Finlay, self-other normative asymmetry is not inconsistent with utilitarianism, (or fair egalitarianism).  One is morally prohibited from supposing that, all other things being equal, one’s own interests are more important than those of others​[20]​ – which establishes a minimum to the regard one must confer on the concerns of others (i.e., equality) – but there seems to be no harm or foul in exceeding that minimum (however, see Section Seven).  To see how this leads to the possibility of actions that may be morally good or praiseworthy yet not personally required, we need first to explore some of the features of the fair egalitarian alternative to radical altruism.


Section Five – Morality as Decision Procedure​[21]​

There is a seeming endless variety of opinions as to the relation between morality and self-interest.​[22]​  How one frames that relation has a lot to do with how one proposes to resolve the profusion of ethical and conceptual issues arising out of it.  Here it will be argued that morality and self-interest play a dual role, both as objects of interest and as practical decision procedures.  Finlay’s underappreciation of morality will be shown to arise, at least in part, from a failure to recognize that latter role.

“Interest” here represents the generic pro-attitude – anything a person sees as a reason in itself for doing or not doing something – and will be treated as synonymous with “motive”, “value”, “attitude”, “preference”, “concern”, “desire”, “end”, etc.  The determination that a person has an interest is a purely empirical matter, crucially dependent upon evidence concerning what persons in fact value and do in particular circumstances:  contingent causes are needed to explain contingent actions.  That differentiates this approach from those that imagine factors involved in human motivation can be derived on purely conceptual grounds (e.g. Korsgaard 1986, Korsgaard 1997 and Nagel 1978).  Bernard Williams, for example, speculates

Somebody may say that every rational deliberator is committed to constraints of morality as much as to the requirements of truth or sound reasoning.  But if this is so, then the constraints of morality are part of everybody’s S [motivational set], and every correct moral reason will be an internal reason.​[23]​

On the approach here, that would be a mistake:  whether someone is moved by some actual concern cannot be determined a priori.  Suppositions about what people would value and do were they properly morally rational, alas, have little to do with what people actually value and do – except insofar as people are in fact motivated by moral considerations.  Here interests are purely empirical, differentiated only by their objects, the things people discover to be reasons (for themselves) for action.  Some objects of interest are moral:  persons can be motivated to do what is right in itself.  Other interests can instead be specifically self-directed, what Finlay calls “self-focused” (pp. 148‑149).  For present purposes it is useful to lump all non-moral interests together as self-interests, regardless of whether they are specifically self-directed.  For the crucial ethical issue is whether an action does or doesn’t embody moral constraints, irrespective of whatever other concerns might be involved.  While being one of the self’s interests, morality is thus not itself a “self-interest”.  Consequently, qua objects of interest, here morality and self-interest are both mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.

Finlay agrees with distinguishing morality and self-interest on the basis of their differences as objects of interest, their differences qua teleological entities.​[24]​  He understands self-interest as a kind of prudence, a conception of what a person ideally should do in service to their own good though in practice might not.​[25]​  Consequently, for Finlay morality and self-interest, albeit mutually exclusive objects, do not together exhaust those that might motivate someone.​[26]​  For my purposes, as we have seen, it is preferable to make morality and self-interest jointly exhaustive as well as mutually exclusive, i.e. effecting a binary partition.  But this is a semantic difference, more or less irrelevant to the argument that follows.  How we delineate the relation between morality and self-interest qua objects of interest is less important than the possibility that another role may be even more fundamental.  I contend that they also represent different deliberative protocols, different decision procedures. 

The Self-interest Protocol is the well-studied practical model, most thoroughly elaborated in the form of Bayes’ Theorem (see Resnik 1987, Chap. 3).  Less technically, we can break the process down into four steps.

	Self-interest Protocol
S1.  Determine the available alternatives.
S2.  Determine your relevant interests.
S3.  Rate the alternatives in terms of the interests they realize.
S4.  Choose the highest-rated (maximal, optimal) alternative.​[27]​

As suggested, this can be developed much more technically and precisely.  Bayes’ Theorem takes into account the probabilities of the different alternatives, alternatives need to be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive (a partitioning of all possible outcomes), interests need to be ranked on a ratio scale, and so forth.  Some of the steps can plausibly be cast as effective procedures (S3 and S4); others depend more on heuristics (S1 and S2).  Still, putting niceties aside, S1-S4 pretty much represent what is involved in everyday decision-making (though of course not explicitly or step-by-step in that order).  

Things have gotten complicated:  we now have self-interest both as a category of objects of interest and as a decision procedure.  When both procedure and objects are self-interested, we have unequivocally self-interested decisions and behavior – what I will call being strictly self-interested.  But what happens when one is interested in morality, when one regards being fair as more important than some more personal benefit:  e.g. when a tennis player honestly calls her opponent’s shot “in”?  Obviously, in such a circumstance the Self-interest Protocol can lead to a person acting morally; therefore, moral interests are not incompatible with the Self-interest Protocol.  But moral objects of interest are unlike other objects of interest.  For the effect of embracing a moral interest is to change the decision procedure from self-interested to moral!

Moral Protocol
M1.  Determine the available alternatives.
M2.  Determine the relevant interests of all concerned parties.
M3.  Rate the alternatives in terms of the interests they realize.
M4.  Choose the highest-rated (maximal, optimal) fair alternative.​[28]​

Consequently, the role of a moral interest is not limited to the weight of its importance in concert or competition with other interests.  Rather, the true function of moral interest is to flip the deliberative decision procedure from one designed for a single person to one designed for multiple persons, each of whom (at least ab initio) is given equal standing.​[29]​  The fundamental benefit of the Moral Protocol is that it generates others-compatible decisions:  i.e., because everyone is given equal standing, no one has particular grounds for objection.  

As can be seen, the first and third steps of the respective procedures are identical, i.e. S1 = M1 and S3 = M3.  So the difference between choosing self-interestedly and choosing morally lies in changes to the second and fourth steps.  M2, in contrast with S2, accords the interests of the other concerned parties – all the “stakeholders” – equal importance with one’s own.  Were this the only change, we would have something like traditional utilitarianism.​[30]​  But of course utilitarianism is plagued with the problem of distribution of benefits:  nothing in principle prevents one group of persons from making out like bandits whilst everyone else suffers, so long as a greater happiness overall is thereby achieved.  M4, in contrast with S4, requires a fair maximal result, one in which all persons benefit the same, at least all other things being equal.  Everybody gets the same-sized slice of the communal pie unless there is good reason otherwise, e.g. perhaps Lil has been stinting on the chores.  The ceteris paribus clause here is a sticking point, of course; it may seem to render the requirement for fairness fairly vacuous.  But, in fact, as studies with higher mammals like dogs and monkeys have shown, the discernment of ostensive unfairness is not all that difficult (see e.g. de Waal 2006, pp. 44-49).  You need a good reason to treat individuals differently, and not every purported reason counts as a good one.  Filling in those details, of course, is the heart and substance of normative ethics, and hopefully I will be forgiven for not attempting that here; the important thing is that that project not seem inherently implausible or intractable.  

Consequently, being moral requires a curious thing to happen.  You need to rely upon the Self‑interest Protocol to renounce the Self-interest Protocol:  having climbed up that ladder, you need to throw it away.  But the situation is not altogether unfamiliar; it is similar to what is known as the Happiness Paradox – viz., happiness is best achieved, not by striving for it single-mindedly, but by ignoring it and simply pursuing what you find meaningful in life.  To be moral you must, on the basis of your own self’s interests and the Self-interest Protocol, relinquish the right to rely only on your own self’s interests and the Self-interest Protocol.  Differences between Moral and Self-interest Protocols can be seen in their respective handling of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  The basic storyline will be familiar (see Resnik 1987, pp. 47-51).  You and a buddy have been arrested on suspicion of some drunken infraction by a sheriff in a small town you were passing through.  He interrogates you separately, and offers you each the following terms (allowing no consultation with one another):  if one confesses and the other does not, the confessor goes free and the other gets three days in the pokey; if you both confess, you both get two days in jail; but if neither of you confesses, you both spend a single night in jail.  What to do?  If your buddy doesn’t confess, then it seems you should confess – it’s better to go free than spend a night in jail.  But if your buddy does confess, then you also should confess – else you’ll spend three days in the pokey rather than two.  So, at least according to strictly self‑interested reasoning – i.e., one’s non-moral interests and the Self-interest Protocol – it makes sense to confess in either case.  If you and your buddy both reason that way, alas, you will both confess and you will both spend two days in jail, the worst joint outcome.  And, unfortunately, if you switch to the Moral Protocol but your buddy doesn’t, you’ll end up with three days in the pokey while he walks free.  However, were both of you to abide by the Moral Protocol – in particular, by both rejecting unfairness a la M4 and neither confessing – you and your buddy would reap the best overall result, both spending only a single night sobering up in jail.​[31]​  Consequently, it is not incomprehensible that at times a person can achieve maximal results, even from a self-interested standpoint, by acting in accordance with a decision procedure that rejects the self’s own interests as the sole basis for calculating what ought to be done.  It should be apparent that morality and self-interest are mutually exclusive qua practical deliberative procedures – i.e., any laxity with respect to rules M2 and M4 constitutes a reversion to the Self-interest Protocol.​[32]​  Still, both procedures in some particular circumstance may lead to the same alternative being chosen:  what an individual finds to be personally optimal may also happen to be optimally fair for everybody involved.​[33]​ 


Section Six – The Possibility of Supererogation

So how does this approach account for supererogation?  Fair egalitarianism does not exalt the importance of others’ interests, but only obliges one to hold them equal to one’s own.  That creates room for going beyond one’s obligations in that regard:  for treating others’ interests as more important than one’s own, for self-sacrifices that while morally desirable may not be morally required.  But this rejection of omnierogation is from an abstract, quasi-formal perspective – in vitro, as it were.  How does the desirable/required distinction play out in situ, in the clamorous complications of real life?  How does the possibility of according the interests of others more importance than morally required manifest itself in the domain of human actions?  

For not every instance of favoring the concerns of others counts as supererogatory or even morally desirable, as e.g. when Mr. Milquetoast cringes before the demands of the office bully.  More significantly, the structure of an entire institution may unfairly favor the interests of one group over another.  Child trafficking, forced labor, criminal exploitation, sexual exploitation and domestic servitude – all represent modern forms of slavery, of being forced to hold the values of other persons to be more important than one’s own.  Indeed, it is remarkable that what Finlay considers the essence of morality – advancing the well-being of anonymous others over one’s own – is something that would be illegal to force anyone to do.  You might attribute this to the compulsory element, but consider:  would you think it unacceptable to compel someone to not lie, steal or murder?  Regardless, it’s clear that simply according the interests of others more importance than one’s own in itself does not amount to supererogation or indeed anything morally desirable.  What makes the difference, surely, is the intent with which one sacrifices for others.  With supererogation, one’s motivation cannot be involuntary,​[34]​ unwitting, compelled, craven or selfish:  one must intend to do moral good.  Notwithstanding that one may go beyond one’s duty, it’s still the call of morality to which one is responding.  So how can we draw a demarcation between morally desirable actions and morally required actions?

The crucial distinction is between what society ought to do (or what, socially speaking, simply “ought to be done”) and what a particular member of society ought to do.​[35]​  For it’s only from the individual point of view that the difference between what is morally required and what is morally desirable acquires significance.  From a societal (or, more globally, humanitarian) point of view, by contrast, the relevant distinction is between what is required period and what is required of a given person.  In other words, premise (P2) amounts to a conjunction of two distinct claims:

	(P2a)  Whatever is morally good, ought to be done; and
	(P2b)  If anything ought to be done, one ought to do it.

I take (P2a) to be undeniably true:  at a societal or unqualified level, to say something is morally good (or praiseworthy or right) is just to say that it ought to be the case.  But this does not imply that any particular party ought to do it:  (P2b) is logically separate – it does not follow from (P2a).  This is because it’s a matter of the contingent division of responsibility (and/or its lack) in a society whether some person (or proper subgroup) ought to take on some moral requirement, and not something that automatically follows.  We need to distinguish between the moral responsibilities of a society as a whole, and the responsibilities of a particular individual in that society.  In other words, we have a textbook example of the fallacy of division:  what is true of a whole need not be true of any of its parts.  For example, for a society of three members, a, b and c, using “+” to connote grouping:  from “a+b+c ought to do X” one cannot logically infer “a ought to do X” or “b ought to do X” or “c ought to do X” or “a+b ought to do X” or “a+c ought to do X” or “b+c ought to do X”.  At most we can assume it’s the joint responsibility of every person qua member of society to contribute their appropriate share in doing what ought to be done.  

But exactly what is it that ought to be done?  In any society there will be a fund of things that ought to be done but are not being done, a communal moral deficit.  Often these will be wrongs the righting of which pretty much anybody can undertake, regardless of whether the wrongness has resulted from “acts of God” or human agency, and regardless of whether some other party has “official” but ineffectual responsibility for righting it.  (Of course, sometimes particular persons will be more uniquely situated, in terms of position, ability or circumstance, to right some wrong.)  So what counts as a wrong?  It’s tempting to suppose that the fundamental role of moral normativity is the resolution of conflicts between different person’s interests, e.g. when two persons dispute the title to a particular parcel of land.​[36]​  However, there are other types of cases that also require resolution via the Moral Protocol:  for instance, the design of social institutions a la John Rawls (1971).  More important, for present purposes, are cases in which particular individuals suffer some form of undeserved misfortune.  While they could be interpreted as conflicts between the victims of calamity and those in a position to help out but who might rather not, there is a more natural way of construing them.  Clearly it is wrong for someone to be the recipient of such misfortune – that much is entailed simply by the supposition of its undeservedness.  On the assumption that ceteris paribus everyone’s interests are equal, it’s also clear that it is unfair for particular persons to suffer such unwarranted hardship while others do not, irrespective of who or what brought it about.  For a fair egalitarian normativity, therefore, one can derive the moral requirement of beneficence:  an obligation to redress the unfairness of undeserved misfortune.​[37]​  As such, beneficent obligations accrue to society as a whole, and not to any particular person or proper subgroup of society.  It is such a general requirement of beneficence, in particular, that appears to fuel the intuitive appeal of Finlay’s altruistic assumption of a “pure” obligation to the collective interests of anonymous others.  

But there can be differences of opinion as to what counts as a legitimate concern of beneficence.  Few moral approaches, save the most baldly selfish, would deny e.g. some obligation to aid the innocent victims of the 2004 Indonesian tsunami.  But exactly how far does our obligation to respect the interests of others extend – what is one’s personal responsibility vis-à-vis the moral deficit, things that ought to be done that one could assist in doing?  Finlay speaks about one’s obligations regarding the “well-being” and “good” of others with deliberate vagueness:

This account is significantly indeterminate, reflecting my own uncertainty about the content of morality.  Do morality’s concerns encompass the interests of members of other animal species, as I believe, and if so what are the minimal conditions for moral status?  Does it exclude the interests of those guilty of serious moral violations?  How does it enjoin us to weigh the interests of different individuals against one another?  Does it require us to pursue the happiness of others, or merely the alleviation of their sufferings and deprivations?  Fortunately my case does not require a ruling on any of these difficulties. (P. 143.)

Unfortunately, the obviousness of moral obligation in cases like the Indonesian tsunami is insufficient to establish a “pure” commitment to the interests of others.  As we have seen, from the fair egalitarian assumption that interests are equal it is also possible to derive a requirement to redress the undeserved misfortune of those tsunami victims.  So Finlay does need to rule on whether radical altruism “require[s] us to pursue the happiness of others, or merely the alleviation of their sufferings and deprivations”.  For if it only requires the latter, it is so far indistinguishable from fair egalitarianism – a conclusion one suspects Finlay would be wont to reject.  But what is the scope of our responsibilities to the interests of others?  At the very least we would like some principled means of determining a person’s responsibilities with respect to tragedies like the Indonesian tsunami.  If an other-regarding morality requires “counting only some wants and needs of others, and not others” (Finlay 16Jan2017), where does one draw the line?  And does exceeding that line account for supererogative behavior, for “going beyond one’s duty”?

As we have seen, Finlay speaks of the “well-being of anonymous others” without going into detail about what that might involve.  Fair egalitarianism, on the other hand, specifically makes the case for redressing the misfortune suffered by others, so not every interest, not every whim or fancy, warrants consideration.  In addition, the argument has been limited to instances only of undeserved misfortune, to abstract from factors that could complicate the determination of unfairness.  It is one thing for a farmer to lose livestock to an unforeseen outbreak of some unknown disease; it is quite another should the loss result from a reckless and feckless disregard of commonly accepted preventive measures.​[38]​  But despite differences between radical altruism and fair egalitarianism, both agree that, however we choose to estimate the scope of beneficence, it’s obvious that a large moral deficit will always remain.  As Finlay remarks:

There are sufficient millions of people in good moral standing who are suffering and dying at every moment of our lives (victims of poverty, war, famine, disease, homelessness, sex slavery, genocide, oppression, etc.) that our moral debts to others are radically, insistently, unflaggingly demanding on us ….  (P. 143.)

Therefore, even in the best of societies the moral deficit – the mass of wrongs wanting righting – will generally be considerable and enduring.  But what are the requirements for particular individuals in a society?  Finlay supposes that they are equally vast; more precisely, he fails to differentiate society’s moral requirements from those for particular individuals:  “if giving hundreds of thousands of dollars to tsunami victims is the morally best action I can perform, it is the action I morally ought to perform.” 

But while the moral deficit may be large, especially in times of disaster, that responsibility falls on society as a whole, i.e. the entire population – so the share of that responsibility demanded of any particular person may actually be relatively small.  Consequently, there can be a difference between the portion of the moral deficit one should redress and an even greater amount one could redress were one so inclined – viz., a distinction, on the individual level, between what is morally required and what may not be required but nonetheless would be morally desirable to do.  This, of course, creates room in the domain of actions for persons to exceed their appropriate contribution, to “go beyond their duty” – which is to say, to be supererogatory.  But this still presupposes a principled basis for determining what portion of a society’s moral deficit accrues to any particular person; otherwise, there’s no substantive sense in exceeding it.  As we have discovered, Finlay’s radical altruism offers no answer.  Can fair egalitarianism provide such a principled basis?


Section Seven – The Division of Responsibility

As we have seen, not everything ought equally be everyone’s onus.  So how does fair egalitarianism determine, for any given society and any given member of that society, the portion of responsibility for that society’s moral deficit that belongs to that member?  Without the ability to make that determination, again, one cannot pin down what would count as supererogation.  A bit of “moral geometry” – a pictorial representation of differences between conflict-resolution and beneficence – will help point to an answer.  

Consider on the one hand case 1a in which two neighbors are disputing the ownership of a piece of land, and on the other case 1b where an unforeseeable tragedy has inflicted major damage on a neighbor’s property.  We can graphically depict these circumstances.  Assume that points on a plane represent things capable of exclusive ownership, and that closed figures on that plane represent the properties of particular individuals.  The moral problems are on the left, and their resolutions via the Moral Protocol are on the right.

In case 1a, the grey overlapped area on the left represents the property whose ownership is contested.  One can imagine all sorts of additional complications, but the initial fair egalitarian assumption is that A’s and B’s interests are equal.  Consequently, the resolution of that dispute consists of evenly splitting the difference between A and B, as shown on the right-hand side.  In case 1b, the blacked-out region on the left represents undeserved property damage suffered by A; and the fair egalitarian solution on the right, presuming that all other things are equal, again consists of evenly splitting the difference.  

However, in case 1b all other things generally are not equal!  Usually A and B will not be isolated from everyone else as if on a desert island – they will be part of a more inclusive society, in which case B does not bear the burden of A’s restitution alone.  Consider the example of Amish farming communities in which, when one family e.g. loses a barn to fire, everybody gathers together to build them a new one.  Indeed, putting aside questions of convenience and contiguity, A’s interests are pro tanto equal to those of every other person in the world (“No man is an island”), all the latter therefore equally sharing responsibility for aiding A in this time of need.  Practically speaking, of course, the closer persons are related to A by geography, social community, kinship, etc. the greater their presumptive moiety of obligation, though in moments of large-scale catastrophe the moral commitment spreads quickly and easily across the globe.  Consequently, in cases like 1b many others in addition to B will usually share the moral liability for rehabilitating A’s condition, up to and including the entire remaining population of the planet.  As we have seen, all other things being equal, for n persons the portion for each will be 1/nth of the total.  So my share of the obligation to help e.g. the victims of the 2004 Indonesian tsunami may not itself be unendurable or even very considerable.  For example, if every one of the 6½ billion persons alive at that time were to share in the estimated $15 billion recovery expense of that disaster, the average contribution would be a mere $2.31.​[39]​  But also, all other things being equal, we would expect each person’s obligation to be proportional to their ability to contribute (a la tithing).  In which case, given the enormous accumulation of wealth outside of the hands of the common person, the required contribution from the hoi polloi may become literally negligible.  Of course, all kinds of casuistry lurk in ceteris paribus clauses.  Still, given the vast inequities in the distribution of wealth in most societies throughout the world, it’s hard to imagine that the average person’s yearly share of required charitable contributions rises substantially above the “few hundred dollars” that Finlay deprecates (p. 144).

This picture is complicated by the fact that many people manage to avoid doing their part; Finlay (16Jan2017) points out that “there’s still a legitimate question about what one ought to do given that others aren’t doing their share”.  In such a circumstance, obviously, the contributions needed from others else will have to proportionately increase.  Nonetheless, according to fair egalitarianism there is a determinable limit to the contribution required from any particular member for the alleviation of society’s moral deficit – one which, aside from times of existential threat to society as a whole, will not demand severe or crippling sacrifices on the part of the average citizen.  It thus deals with the “paradox of supererogation” by replacing the claim that “one ought to do whatever is right” with the more moderate claim that “one ought to contribute appropriately to whatever is right” (see Section Ten).  That is to say, there is a clear demarcation that can be drawn between what one is morally required to do vis-à-vis alleviating the moral deficit of society and the additional, morally desirable contributions one could make, were one so inclined.  

But just as the possibility of treating others’ interests as more important than one’s own was insufficient in itself to account for supererogation, neither can the distinction between contributing one’s share in alleviating the moral deficit and exceeding it.  As remarked earlier, the supererogator goes beyond the call of duty but not beyond the call of morality.  We expect his or her actions to reveal an interest in morality itself, an interest in alleviating the plight of the unfortunate.  But that need not always be the case with those who contribute more than their fair share in addressing the moral deficit.  Imagine an odd game show, for example, in which the winner is given a choice between taking home a new car or taking home a new car and having $1,000,000 donated to his or her favorite charity.  A similar situation crops up more realistically whenever you donate things for which you have no longer have any use (e.g. old furniture, books, appliances, etc.) to others who may yet find them very useful.  And indeed, as noted earlier, it is always possible for the same action that benefits oneself to benefit others.  Consequently, contributing more than one’s proper share in alleviating the social moral deficit need not come at any significant personal cost, and when it doesn’t it becomes questionable whether the term “supererogation” should apply.  For in such circumstances there are no grounds for supposing the person has any intrinsic interest in doing what is right.  Of course, these circumstances will be relatively rare:  almost always the “game” will be zero-sum – sweat and treasure expended in helping others will be sweat and treasure not expended on oneself.  Still, insofar as supererogation requires commitment to morality, it requires sacrifice of one’s own interests in service to those of others.  To sum up:  persons act supererogatorily when they treat the legitimate moral interests of others as more important than their own through contributions that exceed their appropriate share of society’s moral responsibilities.​[40]​
 

Section Eight – Moral Sainthood

Therefore, according to fair egalitarianism persons have an “imperfect” duty to assist others that can be supererogatorily exceeded by those willing to do more than their own fair share in alleviating societal and humanitarian ills.  It agrees with Finlay’s radical altruism in supposing that such persons are only doing what ought to be done, but disagrees with his presumption of omnierogation:  that those persons are only doing what they in particular ought to do.  For what can be morally required of society as a whole is distinct from what can be required of given individuals in that society:  it is not every person’s responsibility to right all of society’s wrongs.  Recall Finlay’s belief that moral saints are better situated than ordinary folks to appreciate the implications of morality’s other-regardingness.  He argues:  

Moral saints themselves act as they do because they come to judge that they ought so to act, that the situation demands action of them.  In reaching that judgment they do not take themselves to be somehow specially distinguished people:  their judgments are not, in general, to be explained in terms of a perceived special responsibility to the people they help.  (P. 144.)

On the fair egalitarian account, moral saints are correct in believing that the situation demands action, and in believing that they are not specially distinguished so far as responsibility for alleviating it is concerned.  Indeed, they are correct in believing that someone or some group needs to take action with respect to the moral deficit.  The mistake is in the inference that the situation demands action specifically of them or indeed of anybody or any proper subgroup:  the moral deficit as such is a burden on society as a whole.  For society as a whole, what is morally good or praiseworthy is indeed morally required – its just that the entire responsibility for addressing it does not pass down omnierogatorily en masse to every element in that society.

But a problem still remains for this account, one touched on earlier.  It has been supposed from the start that fair egalitarianism, while requiring the interests of others to be treated as at least equal to one’s own, permits the treatment of one’s own interests as less important than those of others.  Because not explicitly ruled out, this was implicitly accommodated in

 (FE)  I need to value the interests of others as equal to my own.

But insofar as the Moral Protocol establishes the normative implications of fair egalitarianism, in particular via the step M4 requirement that decisions be fair to everyone, that should be revised to the simpler claim that

(FE')  I need to value everyone’s interests as equal.

Indeed, on the basis of the coherence requirement imposed earlier – that moral characterizations from the perspective of self need to be the same as those from the perspective of other – if (ceteris paribus) others must regard my interests as equal to theirs, then to avoid contradiction I must also treat my interests as equal to theirs.  The implication is clear:  any person engaged in supererogatory behavior, even when helping others to be treated fairly, is pro tanto treating themselves unfairly.  But this poses a problem because, as Finlay put it above, “To my ear it is absurd to condemn a person as immoral because he sacrificed too much for the sake of others”.  The exemplars of supererogation are the moral saints:  those who make particularly outstanding self-sacrifices in efforts to benefit the lives and well-being of others.  Insofar as they represent a critical test case, the question becomes:  Can the fair egalitarian account of supererogation make sense of moral sainthood?  

As we have seen, for Finlay this saintliness requires abject self-sacrifice.  In that grim depiction he follows in the footsteps of Susan Wolf, who elaborates in “Moral Saints”​[41]​ a view he holds to be “similar but not the same”.​[42]​  Wolf distinguishes between the “Loving Saint” and the “Rational Saint”, where the former acts out of a genuine concern for the well-being of others, while the latter acts instead out of a sense of duty that overrules personal concerns and interests.  However, there is general agreement that moral saints are characterized by supererogation.  If so, then anyone who believes there is a duty to go “beyond the call of duty” is massively confused.  And while there may indeed be saint wannabes befuddled enough to embrace overt contradiction, our esteem for persons like e.g. Mother Teresa and Oskar Schindler would appear incompatible with a presumption of such confusion.​[43]​  Therefore, “Rational Saint” is something of an oxymoron, leaving “Loving Saint” as the only plausible model.  

According to Wolf, the Loving Saint is a person whose “concern for others plays the role that is played in most of our lives by more selfish, or, at any rate, less morally worthy concerns” (p. 420), a preoccupation she finds bland and bleak.  Adopting the posture of moral guidance counselor, Wolf opines that “we have reason not to aspire to this ideal and … some of us would have reason to be sorry if our children aspired to and achieved it.”  (P. 436.)  Her reasoning seems to be influenced by the failure, shared with Finlay, to distinguish what is morally required of a societal group as a whole from what may be required of any particular individual.​[44]​  Unlike him, Wolf does not see morality as absurdly and perversely self-abnegating; indeed, he criticizes her for suggesting, a la (FE), that everyone’s interests are equal (see p. 141, note 17).  Nonetheless, she also finds the vocation of sainthood an unenviable, intolerable lot, demanding a debilitating commitment to “moral perfection” to the exclusion of everything else:  

A moral saint will have to be very, very nice. It is important that he not be offensive. The worry is that, as a result, he will have to be dull-witted or humorless or bland.…  There seems, in other words, to be a kind of joy which the Loving Saint, either by nature or by practice, is incapable of experiencing….  The Loving Saint one might expect of missing a piece of perceptual machinery, of being blind to some of what the world has to offer.  (Pp. 422, 424.)

She suggests, in particular, that the moral purity required of the saint entails a naïve prudery incapable of appreciating the sardonic wit of Groucho Marx (p. 422).​[45]​  But, as we have seen, at least on the fair egalitarian interpretation of moral normativity, there need be no pledge of absolute perfection.  Instead, a moral saint need “only” possess a deep commitment to the fair treatment and well-being of others, something that, while unfortunately rare, is hardly incompatible with a witted appreciation of humankind’s follies.  And a closer examination of the lives of persons like Mother Teresa and Oskar Schindler is sure to find evidence of traits and behavior that aren’t really “very, very nice”.​[46]​  Arguably, those persons’ actions remain saintly nonetheless.  

The fair egalitarian requisites for supererogation do not include abject self-abnegation or an infinite reservoir of niceness.  They only suppose a willingness to go beyond what morality personally requires in alleviating the unfairness suffered by others – something entirely compatible with e.g. a taste for smelly cigars and lecherous innuendo.  But if the preceding argument has been more or less on track, this supererogation is hardly the exclusive province of moral saints.  Undoubtedly, a great many people – perhaps anxious for good reason in unstable and fractious times – focus their concerns more on themselves and those close to them.  Despite this, statistics published in 2015 claim that 67% of American households contributed to charity a yearly average of $1872 for a staggering total of $258.51 billion.​[47]​  That’s an enormous sum that suggests that perhaps millions of Americans donate more than their fair share of beneficence might require.  Of course, this is a rough, back-of-the-envelope estimate; we would have to crawl deeper into the weeds for a more accurate determination of any particular person’s share – but that determination seems tractable.  Still, were moral sainthood achieved merely by contributing more than one’s minimal requirement for the relief of undeserved misfortune, achievers would likely number in the millions.  The honorific “moral saint” accrues rather to cases wherein both the moral benefit to others and the attendant self-sacrifice are of genuinely heroic proportions, exemplified e.g. by a trooper throwing himself on a grenade to save the lives of fellow soldiers, or a doctor risking her life amidst the ravages of a deadly infectious disease.  Of course, Christians have special examples of their own, including most notably their founder.

But whether an act of supererogation is exemplary or mundane, the problem for fair egalitarianism remains:  is not the willingness to favor the interests of others over one’s own contrary to the requirements of the Moral Protocol?  That is, one cannot attribute greater importance to the interests of others without attributing lesser importance to one’s own – i.e., without treating oneself as unequal to them.  Let us grant that – indeed, it is because supererogators are treating themselves unfairly that their actions are not morally required!  But first of all, note the self-other normative asymmetry differentiating mistreatment by one’s self from mistreatment by others:  in the latter case one has an obvious ground for complaint, but in the former there is no one else to complain about.  With the acceptance of self-mistreatment one is, as it were, refusing to press charges.  And assuming one is compos mentis, it is simply patronizing for others to press the issue.  This is why societies generally do not forbid self-harm that does not negatively affect others, e.g. voluntary obesity or tobacco use.  As per John Locke (1690, p. 328):  “Though the Earth and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person.  This no Body has any Right to but himself.”  So while unfair treatment of oneself by oneself as such may indeed be contrary to what the Moral Protocol requires, it is hardly an immorality that demands condemnation – if only because nobody else is getting hurt.  It hardly compares with the unqualified immorality of unfair treatment by others.  The second thing to note is that with supererogation the unfairness to self is presumably the unavoidable price for effecting a greater fairness for others.  And it is generally accepted that a greater moral cause excuses minor infractions, as e.g. one may justifiably “borrow” a stranger’s unattended phone to make a life-or-death call.  So, while the self-sacrifice involved in supererogation might be indeed wrong in itself according to fair egalitarianism, any fault of that offense is easily offset and excused by a greater collateral benefit to society at large.  Note third that the fundamental assumption has been that ceteris paribus everyone’s interests are equal.  If ever there were circumstances when all other things weren’t equal, so far as the wrongness of unfairness is concerned, it would be when persons willingly self-sacrifice for the benefit of others.  Consequently, a moral saint should not fear condemnation by others for the “immorality” of sacrificing his or her interests in the furtherance of theirs.  


Section Nine – Why Should One Be Moral?

The debate over morality versus self-interest has long focused on one particular question:  “Why should I be moral?”  Prima facie, that a person would behave in accordance with their self-interests is a no-brainer.  After all, on the present account that’s what persons’ interests are for:  they represent reasons for action.  Given that, the puzzle is how and why anyone could ever opt for a constraint on their own interests?  Wouldn’t they be relying on the constraint being carried out by the very thing that is supposedly being constrained?  And isn’t any constraint inherently disadvantageous insofar as it inhibits the satisfaction of what one may want or desire?  Consequently, at first sight it is genuinely puzzling that a person ever could or would opt to be moral instead of acting simply according to self-interest.  Fortunately, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, we can steer our way around these antithetical speed bumps.  To begin with, acting according to a moral interest, while not acting according to self-interest, is still acting according to the self’s interest.  Furthermore, there is nothing incoherent in supposing that one of the rules on List #1 directs a person to cease using List #1 and use the rules on List #2 instead.  If one follows that rule, is one following List #1 or List #2?  Well, both of course:  one is following a rule on List #1 that tells one to use the rules on List #2.  There would only be incoherence if the rules on List #2 circularly directed one back – with no other changes – to the rules on List #1.  So, when a self’s moral interest requires the move from the Self-interest Protocol to the Moral Protocol, one is abiding by both:  the conclusion of the Self-interest Protocol has been to replace itself with the Moral Protocol.​[48]​  It is not incoherent to suppose that a self’s interests thus constrain themselves, for it can be in the self’s interest to abandon the self’s own interests as the sole basis for rational decision-making.  This only looks paradoxical; instead it’s just ironic.  For example, it can be rational to discard rationality:  imagine a bleak scenario, a la the TV show “24”, in which the only way to prevent some terrorist horror is to allow yourself to be driven mad.  Of course, with morality the situation is not quite so dire – it doesn’t require irrationality, but only a not-always-obviously-preferable form of rationality for handling choices involving others.

Morality exercises its constraint on self-interest by modifying the practical decision-making process to produce results that are fair for everybody, i.e. results that are others‑compatible.  It is in that respect completely attitude- and mind-independent – it has that specific form and function regardless of whether you are yourself motivated to make use of it, not unlike etiquette (cf. Foot 1972).  This suggests an answer to the question “Why should I be moral?”  Insofar as social cooperation is beneficial to an intelligent species, it is not far-fetched that its members might evolve conceptual abilities that facilitate persons working in concert, e.g. an innate appreciation of others‑compatible reasoning.  Typically such a heritable trait will be polymorphic, i.e. with variation in the degree of its genetic expression in individuals.  So just as some people are inherently good at math, while others not so much, some people will be inherently good at fairness and beneficence, while others again not so much.  Among the former we will find the moral saint, among the latter the psychopath.  Such a trait could provide the groundwork for a thoroughly rational basis for cooperation, one that requires and depends upon good reasons for treating anybody differently:  viz., the Moral Protocol.  Anyone engaged or involved with others can appreciate the utility of others-compatible decisions:  if nothing else, as such they provide no one with any rational basis for complaint.  It’s equally clear why reasonable persons would consider failure to abide by others-compatible constraints as grounds for blame and punishment (“Hey, I’m walking here!”).  

For Finlay, by contrast, there is no real answer to the question “Why should I be moral?”  Once one denies morality its pretension of overridingness, it no longer really functions as morality.  Rather, it becomes just one more consideration amongst the many, something a particular person may or may not find compelling on some occasion.  As we have seen, he rejects the possibility of any special rational warrant for the moral constraint of self-interest:

Morality is only one kind of practical consideration, one normative point of view among many, without any special rational authority.  It is purely other-regarding simply because this is its essential character, and its relation to other normative domains is complex, not that of simple supremacy.  The categorical force of morality is a social and pragmatic or rhetorical phenomenon rather than a rational one ….  (P. 142; my emphases.)

In effect, Finlay’s failing is that he never gets beyond seeing morality and self-interest as objects of interest; as a consequence, he doesn’t appreciate their distinct role as practical decision procedures.  In particular, he overlooks the possibility that morality might function as an add-on, as it were, to the self’s standard deliberation app, one designed especially for generating others‑compatible choices – choices that are rationally amenable to everyone involved.  And by picturing moral normativity as a nagging scold of blind other-regard, he never recognizes its potential benefits as a rational tool for multi-person decision-making and conflict-resolution. 


Section Ten – Summation and Conclusion

Finlay’s radical altruism has two important components.  First, there is his presumption that moral normativity is “purely and essentially other-regarding” – entailing self-abnegation.  Second, there is his assumption of premise (P2), that one ought to do whatever is morally good – entailing omnierogation.  The stringency of these requirements necessitates, at least practically speaking, his further view that morality is just one more object of interest a person may or may not find compelling in some circumstance, without rational claim to overriding significance.  I have countered Finlay's view with fair egalitarianism, a normativity assuming the ceteris paribus equality of persons’ interests, and exemplified in a deliberative procedure – the Moral Protocol – that generates others-compatible decisions.  Arguably more in tune with ordinary opinion and moral tradition, it repudiates self-abnegation and omnierogation, and establishes a distinction in the communal moral deficit between what is required of a person and what is not required but nonetheless would be good or praiseworthy for the person to do.  This allows for supererogation, whether through the modest donation of the almsgiver or the heroic self-sacrifice of the moral saint.​[49]​

Fundamental differences between radical altruism and fair egalitarianism can be highlighted by respective versions of the syllogism introduced earlier representing Finlay’s view:

(P1) To benefit the interests of others is morally good; 
(P2) One ought to do whatever is morally good; 
(C) Therefore, one ought to benefit the interests of others.

The (RA) version of this simply renders explicit the universal quantification over who is obligated and what they are obligated to do:

(RA:P1) Anything that benefits the interests of others is morally good; 
(RA:P2) Everyone ought to do whatever is morally good; 	
(RA:C) Therefore, everyone ought to do anything that benefits the interests of others.

The main problem, as we have seen, is that conclusion (RA:C) implies that everyone is equally responsible for doing everything that ought to be done in a society, including its entire moral deficit.  But what is obviously needed is some kind of division of labor:  you cannot intelligibly task everyone simultaneously with everything that requires being done.  This (FE) version of the syllogism emphasizes the differences between fair egalitarianism and radical altruism:

(FE:P1) Anything that benefits the legitimate needs of others is morally good; 
(FE:P2) Everyone ought to contribute appropriately to whatever is morally good;
(FE:C) Therefore, everyone ought to contribute appropriately to anything that benefits the legitimate needs of others.

First, instead of speaking generally about any and all of a person’s interests, the first premise here restricts other-regarding to the legitimate needs of individuals, i.e. the appropriate concerns of beneficence.  Second and more importantly, instead of requiring everyone personally to do every single thing that ought to be done, (FE:P2) only obliges everyone to contribute appropriately – as determined by the Moral Protocol – in doing what ought to be done.  Which, as we have seen, in the case of the 2004 Indonesian tsunami might average only a couple of dollars per person, and not (as Finlay imagines) hundreds of thousands. 
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^1	  As notably criticized in Street 2006.
^2	  Finlay 2007.  Page references in the text are to this article unless otherwise indicated.
^3	  While Finlay does not himself call his view of morality “radical altruism”, he does call it both “radical” and “altruistic” – so combining the two does not seem too unfair or misleading.  
^4	  Not every stray impulse or hankering warrants consideration.  See Section Six below for a discussion of what counts as a “legitimate” moral concern.
^5	  The literature emphasizes the connection between “ought” and “good”, but this is not to imply that one should not do what is morally “better” or “best” in circumstances where such distinctions are relevant.  (Thanks to Dr. Finlay for this clarification in helpful comments on an earlier draft, henceforth referred to as “Finlay 16Jan2017”.)
^6	  The idea that altruism lies at the heart of morality has been influenced by studies in evolutionary psychology, where a long-standing stumper is to explain how the apparent selfishness of natural selection can lead to individuals sacrificing themselves for others.  See, e.g., Kitcher 2003, p. xiii:  “Biologists think of altruistic behavior as behavior that promotes the reproductive success of the beneficiary at the reproductive cost of the agent.”
^7	  Heyd 1982, 2015 calls omnierogation “anti-supererogation”; however, the former term is a little less of a mouthful and characterizes the view more directly qua what it is instead of qua being against what it isn’t.  Brinkmann 2015 suggests “rigorism”, but that doesn’t show the connection with supererogation.
^8	  Finlay wants to claim that supererogation technically is not, after all, impossible on his view:  “Taking this line does not require that we reject the existence of supererogation or acts ‘beyond the call of duty’, because arguably the concept of moral obligation is narrower than the concept of what we morally ought to do.” (P. 146.)   But what is left of the action-guiding role of “ought” if it connotes neither what one is obligated to do nor what one wants to do?  Finlay 2014 (p. 78ff) argues that the term expresses “end-relational probabilities”, but obviously when I say “You ought to do X!” this may be despite the fact that you didn’t do X.
^9	  Finlay 16Jan2017:  “I have in mind philosophers’ characterizations of morality.”
^10	  Indeed, neither of the two philosophers Finlay cites as sharing his view of extreme self-abnegation (p. 141, note 20) provides unqualified support.  Singer 1995 is expanding a circle of normative concern that begins with “needs and desires of my own, certainly”, p. 174; and Kagan 1991 sees morality as concerned with “the overall good” and “the greater good”, which presumably include his own good under most circumstances. 
^11	  Finlay 16Jan2017:  “I argue that ordinary (= nonphilosophical) people have conflicting views about this.  Moral saints and heroes see things the way I do.”
^12	  And if a Finlayian is tempted to protest, “But moral saints inherently benefit others!”, this would come perilously close to admitting a rational basis for preferring moral ends.
^13	  Finlay adopts the witch example from Joyce 2001.
^14	  It is both ironic and enlightening that you will reach the same result if everyone starts instead from a position of absolute selfishness.  
^15	  That no three positive integers a, b, and c satisfy the equation an + bn = cn for any integer value of n greater than 2.
^16	  Parfit 2011 is a recent notable attempt to reach out for consensus.
^17	  These characteristics are reflected in steps M2 and M4 respectively of the Moral Protocol; see Section Five.
^18	  Indeed, Finlay appears to concede as much with his assumption of “self-love”.  
^19	  The asymmetry scuttles the notion that there could be a “mirror” of supererogation in a deontic category of offense, consisting of actions that are bad to do but not good not to do; see e.g. Chisholm and Sosa 1966 and Mellema 1991.
^20	  Compare Bloomfield 2008a, p. 5:  “Moral theories are checks on people’s naturally self-aggrandizing sense of self-interest”. 
^21	  Unlike Rawls 1951, in which “decision procedure” connotes a societal mechanism for producing results amenable to all, the phrase is used here more in the sense of an algorithm or effective procedure.  I am concerned here less with what people will accept as fair than I am with what people should (rationally) accept as fair.
^22	  Bloomfield 2008b, the collection containing Finlay’s essay, provides a nice representation of this variety.
^23	  Williams 1989, p. 37.  Williams is responding to Korsgaard 1986, which in turn responds to Williams 1981.
^24	  “An attractively simple and intuitive approach to defining and individuating normative domains is to do so teleologically, as determined by particular ends or goals”, p. 139.
^25	  “[A]n action is in my self-interest (good for me) just in case and to the degree that it promotes a life containing intrinsically rewarding pursuit and/or accomplishment of goals that I strongly and intrinsically care about at the time of my pursuit/accomplishment of them.”  P. 149.
^26	  As we have seen, on his view they both seem relatively unimportant:  “For virtually none of us, therefore, is it the case that doing what we morally or self-interestedly ought to do is what matters most for us in most circumstances.”  P. 154.
^27	  I interpret satisficing as a maximizing strategy which takes into account the diminishing rewards of determining and effecting the absolute maximum.
^28	  Of course, sometimes the choice which is optimal in terms of realized interests is not the fairest – sometimes one can only choose the least unfair alternative, aka the lesser evil.
^29	  If you squint, the Moral Protocol is reminiscent of Kant’s Categorical Imperatives:  step M2 requires one to have regard for other persons’ ends as well as one’s own, and step M4 requires a result that is universal, i.e. equally fair for, and therefore equally acceptable to, everybody.  “And what is it then that entitles a morally good disposition or virtue to make such high claims?  It is nothing less than the share it obtains for a rational being in universal legislation, by which it makes it fit to be a member of a possible kingdom of ends” (Kant 1785, IV 434).
^30	  An important difference is that according equal weight to the interests of others a la M2 does not require their leviathanic aggregation:  i.e., one can morally respect the contrary values of others without taking on those values or relinquishing one’s fundamental commitment to one’s own.
^31	  Of course, moral consensus is much easier to achieve when, unlike the situation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the various interested parties can communicate with each other.  
^32	  Supererogation, as we shall see, represents the opposite of laxity.
^33	  Finlay concurs:  “We can do the morally right thing while pursuing our own personal good (e.g. stopping a terrorist from detonating a bomb on one’s flight).”  (P. 138.)
^34	  The fact that some supererogators claim they “could not do otherwise” is sometimes thought to represent a moral incapacity; cf. Williams 1993, Cowley 2015a and Archer 2015.  But insofar one is interested in distinguishing those aspects of behavior that reflect a person’s interests, describing acting on one’s dominating interests as “unfree” or “involuntary” simply muddles the issue.
^35	  A distinction between general and individual oughts is suggested by Heyd 2015:  “Supererogation is exactly what one personally does not have to do, even if it ought to be done by someone or would lead to a state of affairs which ‘ought to exist.’” However, he does not go into the details of how that distinction might be effected.  Raz 1975, p. 166, also considers this possibility – “A’s action of bringing about that p is supererogatory only if p ought to occur but it is not the case that A ought to bring about that p.”  However, he dismisses its significance, assuming that if A is not responsible for p then somebody else already is – overlooking the possibility that moral responsibility might accrue indifferently to society as a whole (as particularly with beneficence; see below).
^36	  Cf. Baier 1958, p. 190:  “For morality is designed to apply in just such cases, namely, those where conflicts occur.”
^37	  The term “beneficence” is sometimes restricted to relatively minor acts of charity.  I am using it here in a more general sense, for any relief of unwarranted misfortune.
^38	  The case can be made that all persons deserve a certain basic minimum of support regardless of their culpability in their misfortunes; the system of welfare is based on that assumption.  The problem is to determine exactly what that “minimum” consists of.  I shall not try to crack that nut here.
^39	  Finlay 16Jan2017:  “That’s certainly a very good point, and one I wish I had been more attentive to.”
^40	  J. O. Urmson’s pioneering “Saints and Heroes” (1958) has influenced viewing supererogation as a peculiar category of actions that are good to do but not bad not to do.  From the point of view of the present work that characterization unfortunately “bakes in” a conflation of societal and individual moral responsibilities that effectively severs the connection between moral requirement, and moral goodness and badness.  Mellema 1991, for example, postulates a “quasi-supererogation” in which moral praiseworthiness and blameworthiness have become completely separated from moral duty.  Here whatever is morally good or praiseworthy is morally required – it just may not be required of you. 
^41	  Wolf 1982.  Wolf page references in the text are to this article.
^42	  P. 139.  The major difference between their views, according to Finlay, is that Wolf “allows that moral sainthood may be in the self-interest of certain kinds of people” (ibid.), though he admits much the same:  “Some people care greatly about the welfare of anonymous others” (p, 154).
^43	  Finlay’s examples; he makes a similar argument – see pp. 143-145. 
^44	  In addition, Wolf expresses a curious dissatisfaction with “the fact that one is just one person among others equally real and deserving of the good things in life” (pp. 436-437).  But how are things supposed to work if everyone supposes they deserve more of the good things in life than everyone else?  There is a hint here of a confusion between the requirement to accept the values of others as equal to one’s own, and a leviathanic obligation to adopt the values of others as one’s own.  The Moral Protocol does not prohibit the exclusive, full-throated pursuit of one’s personal interests as long as they don’t conflict with those of others or preclude one’s beneficent duties.
^45	  Wolf concludes that, since the life of the moral saint is so terrible, morality itself may not be all it’s cracked up to be; specifically, she “call[s] into question the assumption that it is always better to be morally better.” (P. 438.)  Instead, I would question e.g. her assumption that it is morally better to be oblivious to Groucho’s humor.
^46	  See http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/31/asia/mother-teresa-controversies/ and https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/25/germany.film for some idea of the criticisms they have faced.  Both retrieved 9 Nov 2016.
^47	  http://nccs.urban.org/nccs/statistics/charitable-giving-in-america-some-facts-and-figures.cfm.  Retrieved 9 Nov 2016.
^48	  Whether to use moral rationality – the Moral Protocol – thus involves a hypothetical imperative (a la Foot 1972).  But once the moral decision procedure has been selected, its results are by design independent of what any particular individual might personally prefer – viz., categorical imperatives (a la Kant 1785).  This pretty much founders the dispute regarding whether moral imperatives are hypothetical or categorical:  they’re both.  Morality is hypothetical on the outside but categorical on the inside.
^49	  Another irony is that supererogatory behavior is especially “easy” for the poor and weak, since their proportional share of the moral deficit is literally negligible.  Cf. Mark 12:44:  “For all they did cast in of their abundance; but she of her want did cast in all that she had, even all her living.”
